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How did surrogate motherhood evolve from a "hare-
brained, fly by night" idea of the late 1970s into one
that had at least some mainstream, middle-class support
in the mid-ig8os? Many explanations have been sug-
gested. Although the rate of infertility has not
increased,1 infertility is no longer a secret, and there are
major public support groups, like RESOLVE, that advo-
cate for infertile couples. New and powerful techniques
like IVF (in vitro fertilization) have been developed, and
although they help very few people,2 they have been
widely publicized and approved. And babies are fash-
ionable again. As one movie critic put it: "Men and
women do not fall in love with each other in the movies
anymore. They fall in love with babies. Babies are the
new lovers-unpredictable, uncontrollable, impossible
and irresistible."
3
These explanations all have some merit. But the core
of surrogate motherhood lies in the modem fairy tale
that babies can properly be viewed as a consumer prod-
uct for those with money to purchase them, and that by
permitting this transaction we will all live happily ever
after. As a product babies have been hyped by slick,
white, middle-class professionals and advertised in the
free-market environment of the 198os. We are asked not
to look behind the resulting children to see their lower-
middle-class and lower-class mothers. But the core re-
ality of surrogate motherhood is that it is both classist
and sexist: a method to obtain children genetically re-
lated to white males by exploiting poor women. While it
is promoted as simply supplying babies for those who
"desperately" want them, in fact it subverts any princi-
pled notion of economic fairness and justice, and under-
mines our commitment to equality and the inherently
priceless value of human life.
We all have myths to comfort us when reality is
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unacceptable. Surrogate motherhood is just one such
myth. But the myth of surrogate motherhood is no
longer sustainable, and without its fairy tale veneer, sur-
rogate motherhood, as we now know it, cannot long
survive. This brief article will argue that the death of
commercial surrogacy should not be mourned. Instead,
our attention should turn to planning for the future, to
avoid the commercialization of human embryos, the
degradation of pregnancy, and the further exacerbation
of class distinctions and economic violence that the use
of embryos genetically unrelated to the "surrogate
mothers" who bear them could bring.
The Birth of "Surrogate Motherhood"
Attorney Noel Keane, the self-proclaimed "father of
surrogate motherhood," first got the idea when Jane
and her husband Tom visited him in September 1976.
4
Tom had "this harebrained idea of finding another
woman to carry a child for them" (Jane was infertile)
but didn't know how to go about it. He had ruled out
adoption:
Maybe it's egotistical but I want my own child.
Adoption leaves me cold. I guess for some women,
as long as they have a child, it's fine. But for me,
it's like if I see my child do something, I need to
know that he's really mine.3
Tom had met Jane during the Vietnam War. He had
seen a lot of men get killed, and told Keane:
[S]ay, if a woman had a couple of children and her
husband was killed in the war, and, say, she
needed a few extra dollars for the family, well,
then maybe she could help someone out who
couldn't have children. The Lord intended women
to have children and I thought maybe one would
want to do what came naturally and maybe help
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somebody else out while helping herself and her
family. Like I say, it's just a fly-by-night idea I
had.6
Tom needed an attorney because he wanted ano-
nymity; otherwise, he said, "I could just go out and look
for a woman." While Keane was thinking it over, an
article appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle about a
man who had successfully advertised to find a woman to
bear a child for him through artificial insemination. He
had paid $7,000 to the woman and another $3,ooo in
legal and medical expenses. The child was born Septem-
ber 6, 1976. Shortly thereafter a medical newspaper re-
ported the story, headlining it: "'Surrogate Mother' Is
Recruited by Ad for Artificial Insemination." Noel
Keane made his decision: "I had never done as much as
an adoption, but if they can do it in California, I
thought, what the hell, we can do it here.' 7
Tom and Jane eventually made a deal with Carol to
be inseminated. There was no fee involved, because
Keane had been properly advised by a probate court
judge that fees were illegal in Michigan. Carol, who was
divorced, recalls making the decision with her three
sons. "I told them what good parents Tom and Jane
would be, and, from the start, we agreed we would call
it Tom and Jane's baby, never mother's baby."' When
Carol became pregnant, Jane recalls: "I wanted to put
Carol under a glass bowl. You know, don't do this,
don't do that. Are you eating right? Are you drinking
enough? Are you taking your vitamins?" 9 The contract
that Tom and Jane signed with Noel Keane stated, ex-
plicitly, "[Ult a surrogate is found and is, in fact, insem-
inated, there is no assurance she will give up the
child."
'i °
Carol did give up the child. But Keane's first case
illustrates most of the problems and pitfalls of so-called
"surrogate motherhood" that remain unresolved more
than a decade later: the use of fairy tale language, the
commodification of children, and the degradation of
pregnant women.
The Reality Behind the Fairy Tales
Fairy tale language is not unique to surrogate mother-
hood. In the past year alone we have witnessed glitzy TV
evangelists preach that they must have our money be-
cause God has demanded it, national security advisers
surreptitiously trading arms for Iran-held hostages in
the name of democratic values, and insatiable stock ma-
nipulators using inside information for personal gain in
the name of free enterprise. Touted as family building
for infertile couples, surrogate motherhood stems from
the same greed that threatens the best impulses and val-
ues in our society. The truth about surrogacy's "family
building" is that it can create one parent-child relation-
ship only by destroying another parent-child relation-
ship. As Elizabeth Kane, the country's first openly paid"surrogate mother," put it recently, "[Slurrogate moth-
erhood is nothing more than the transference of pain
from one woman to another."" Even its strongest sup-
porters freely admit that if they could not pay women a
large fee for giving up their children, they would be out
of business. And the brokers, like Noel Keane, usually
charge at least as much for their own services (approx-
imately $io,ooo) as they are willing to pay women to
undertake a pregnancy and give up their child. Nor is it
"just like adoption." Adoption seeks to find rearing par-
ents for children without them; surrogacy seeks a child
for would-be rearing parents. Adoption places the inter-
ests of the child first; surrogacy places the interests of
the adults first. The exclusive use of this method by rich
and upper-middle-class white couples proclaims its eco-
nomic class and racial characteristics. For example, al-
though black couples are twice as likely as white couples
to be infertile," this method is not promoted for black
couples, nor has anyone openly advocated covering the
procedure by Medicaid for poor infertile couples.
The central deception, of course, is the name itself.
The term "surrogate motherhood" seems purposely de-
signed to dehumanize the mother and alienate her from
her child. As Noel Keane put it in commenting favorably
on the lower court Baby M decision, "She [the surrogate
mother] has to realize she is carrying their child."'3 As
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted simply and force-
fully, in the Baby M case, "'the natural mother [is] in-
appropriately termed the 'surrogate mother.' 14 When-
ever we decide not to give something its rightful, de-
scriptive name (in this case, "mother" or "birth-
mother"), it seems fair to assume that we are at least
uncomfortable with the reality we are describing and
want to believe some myth instead. In this case, the
phrase "surrogate mother" actually comes from Har-
low's monkey studies, in which newborn monkeys were
separated from their mothers and placed in cages with a
wire or a cloth-covered inanimate "surrogate mother"
to test their responses.' 5 Indeed, this identification of
the "surrogate mother" as inanimate object is often
complete, the so-called surrogate mother being referred
to simply as the "surrogate," and sometimes as a "sur-
rogate womb" or a "surrogate uterus."
Finally, although an attempt is almost always made
to conflate "surrogate motherhood" with new science
and technology, and with "new reproductive tech-
niques," in fact the only thing new about this method is
the introduction of attorneys into human reproduction.
And the lawyer's role itself is inherently deceptive.
Drafting a contract all parties sign, the lawyer usually
assures them that it is "not enforceable"-but nonethe-
less accepts a very large fee for his draftsmanship. It
seems overtime to ask why it's not legal malpractice and
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fraud for attorneys to charge clients large fees to draft
contracts they publicly describe as unenforceable.' 6 But,
of course, it is not the role of contract-drafter that the
lawyer actually plays-that's just another fairy tale for
the adults. The lawyer's real role is that of procurer,
obtaining a woman willing to bear a child for the couple
and give it up to them upon birth. As Barbara Katz
Rothman has noted, although debate on surrogate
motherhood and prostitution continues among femi-
nists, "There is virtual unanimity [among feminists] on
the inappropriateness of other people selling our
bodies." She goes on to term the brokers "the pimps" of
the surrogacy business.' 7 like all pimps, their main mo-
tivation is greed, and their primary concern about
women is how much money they can make by using
them.
The reality of "surrogate motherhood" is that a law-
yer-broker agrees, for a fee, to locate a woman who will
agree to be inseminated with the sperm of a man, have
a baby, and for a fee, agree to give the child up to the
father (or relinquish her parental rights to the child)
upon birth. This is artificial insemination coupled with
baby-selling. But what's wrong with baby-selling?
Baby-Selling
Baby-selling comes complete with its own fairy tale, the
Grirmns' "Rumpelstiltskin." Having agreed to give her
first-born to Rumpelstiltskin if he would spin a roomful
of straw into gold for her (a feat that helped make her
queen), the queen changed her mind upon the birth of
her son, and sought to get out of the contract. Rumpel-
stiltskin gave her a way out: three days to discover his
name. Fortunately for her she did, and Rumpelstiltskin
was so distressed to lose the child that "he tore himself
in two." The Grimms' sympathy was obviously with the
mother, even though she was rich, had entered into the
contract voluntarily, and had profited greatly by it. So is
the sympathy of most readers. But the baby brokers
(and even some women) have argued that "a deal is a
deal" and that the women-almost always poor wom-
en-who have agreed in advance to sell their babies at
birth should be forced to go through with the deal so
that the ability of women to enter contracts is not com-
promised.
Must we force women who change their minds to
sell children they desperately want to raise in order to
satisfy some unrealistic and nonlegal notion of specific
performance? This is economic violence at its starkest
and is properly labeled economic brutality. The simple
answer might be that since we have outlawed the sale of
human kidneys (and other organs) because of the de-
grading prospect of having the rich live off the body
parts of the poor, it follows a fortiori that the sale of
children should also be outlawed. If and when uterine
transplants become feasible, it is doubtful we would (or
should) permit fertile women to sell their uteruses to
women who need them to become pregnant and give
birth. But many would treat children with less respect
than kidneys or uteruses, or at least are willing to permit
fathers to buy the mother's interest in rearing the child
from her and give that interest to their own wife. Should
this be permitted? Sale was not involved in Carol's case,
but was the key to the much more celebrated case of
Mary Beth Whitehead (Baby M).
In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court had no
problem in concluding (as did the Michigan judge
whom Noel Keane consulted more than a decade ago)
that payment to place a child for adoption (even with
the spouse of the child's father) violated the state's
adoption laws. The court declared that "the evils of
baby bartering are loathsome for a myriad of
reasons."' 8 There is coercion, lack of counseling, and
exploitation of all parties (including desperate infertile
couples), as well as the fact that "the child is sold with-
out regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable
parents' ' 9 and the lack of any protection of the natural
mother. Making money takes precedence even over pre-
dictable human suffering. For example, the broker in the
Baby M case failed to make further inquiry when a psy-
chological evaluation of Ms. Whitehead revealed that
she might change her mind. In the court's words: "It is
apparent that the profit motive got the better of the
Infertility Center.... To inquire further might have
jeopardized the Infertility Center's fee." '
The selling of babies, which has been sb slickly
glazed over by others, properly disgusted the court. The
court noted that the originator of this scheme to circum-
vent the law by private contract is "a middle man, pro-
pelled by profit" who "promotes the sale.... [T]he
profit motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately
governs the transaction."23 What's wrong with profit
and using money as the sole measure of the value of
children? The court did not hesitate to say:
There are, in a civilized society, some things that
money cannot buy.... There are . . . values that
society deems more important than granting to
wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or
life. 22
Not the least of these values is the protection of
children from the vicious exploitation that treating them
as commodities would bring, exploitation of the poor by
the rich, and the demeaning of pregnant women
by treating them as breeders indentured to their "em-
ployers."
There has been much confusion about constitutional
rights in the surrogacy arrangement. The only real rights
at stake are those involving the rights to custody of a
child resulting from an unwed pregnancy, and in this
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contest the rights of the child properly take precedence.
There is no constitutional right to purchase a child, even
your own. And whatever "procreation" rights might be
raised to a constitutional level in the area of custody, the
rights of the mother must be at least as strong as those
of the father. Indeed, they are stronger, since fertile men
need a nine-month commitment on the part of a woman
to procreate, whereas fertile women only need sperm to
procreate.
The constitutional right to privacy is founded on
liberty interests in intimacy and freedom of association,
and notions of self-identity and self-expression. Privacy
is not a technocrat's toy, and does not require the gov-
ernment to keep its hands off any method of procreation
that inventors can devise. Treating men and women
equally in the realm of noncoital reproduction may re-
quire that egg donation be treated like sperm donation;
but no principled argument can equate (as the trial judge
in Baby M did) nine months of gestation and ultimate
childbirth with sperm donation. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled, states cannot even permit husbands to
prohibit their wives from having abortions, since,
among other things, "it is the woman who physically
bears the child and she is the more directly affected by
the pregnancy."' 5 An Oklahoma court has also noted
that husbands have no right to prevent their wives from
becoming sterilized. In the court's words:
We have found no authority and the plaintiff has
cited none which holds that the husband has a
right to a childbearing wife as an incident to their
marriage. We are neither prepared to create a right
in the husband to have a fertile wife nor to allow
recovery for damage to such a right. We find the
right of the person who is capable of competent
consent to control his own body paramount.' 4
If husbands have no constitutional right to fertile
wives, it follows that they have no constitutional right to
contract with unrelated women for purposes of repro-
ducing themselves. Although the Baby M court saved
for another day the question of whether a woman can
irrevocably waive her constitutional right to the com-
panionship of her children by a pre-conception contract
(assuming such a contract is "legalized" by future leg-
islation), there would seem to be no basis that would
allow the courts to enforce such an agreement. Even the
lower court Baby M judge, for example, recognized that
a woman could not irrevocably waive her right to ter-
minate her pregnancy under the U.S. Constitution be-
cause judicial enforcement of such an agreement would
be an intolerable burden on the woman.' 5 The argu-
ment against permitting an irrevocable prebirth waiver
of maternal rearing rights seems at least as strong. Both
decisions are so intimately related to the individual's
personhood and human dignity that it would be an in-
tolerable violation of personal integrity to force compli-
ance with either. This is because pregnancy and child-
birth may predictably and radically change self-image
and self-fulfillment aspirations that are central features
of identity and personhood.
The Baby M court could have gone further. It did
not, for example, even discuss the images of slavery in-
herent in enforcing contracts in commercial surrogate
motherhood. Selling children conjures up the indignity
and degradation of selling any human being; but more
than that, specifically enforcing contracts that lead to
the involuntary breakup of a family unit is at the heart
of what many Americans found most repulsive about
slavery prior to the Civil War. As James McPherson, one
of the war's great historians, has noted: "This breakup
of families was the largest chink in the armor of sla-
very's defenders.'
6
McPherson tells us that one of the most powerful
"moral attacks" on slavery was Theodore Weld's Amer-
ican Slavery as It Is. First published in 1839, it was
made up mainly of newspaper excerpts and advertise-
ments. An example:
NEGROES FOR SALE.-A Negro woman 24
years of age, and two children, one eight and the
other three years. Said negroes will be sold sepa-
rately or together as desired. 27
He also notes that the influential Uncle Tom's Cabin
was itself based on the forced breakup of the family:
"Eliza fleeing across the ice-choked Ohio River to save
her son from the slave-trader and Tom weeping for chil-
dren left behind in Kentucky when he was sold South
are among the most unforgettable scenes in American
letters."'a Surrogacy is not slavery. But our inability to
seriously discuss the relevance of selling children and
forcibly removing them from their mothers to one of the
core aspects of nineteenth-century American slavery in-
dicates our preference for dealing with fairy tale ver-
sions of surrogacy.
Since the sale of children can lead to their commod-
ification or reification,' 9 and since this will devalue all
children and put all children at risk, it is quite reason-
able to outlaw the sale of children, even to their fathers.
But if greed is the real root of evil, isn't surrogacy mo-
tivated by love rather than by money (as in the case of
Carol) acceptable?
The Degradation of Pregnancy
Margaret Radin has noted that whether surrogacy is
paid or unpaid it may still involve "ironic self-
deception." In her words:
Acting in ways that current gender ideology char-
acterizes as empowering might actually be disem-
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powering. Surrogates may feel they are fulfilling
their womanhood by producing babies for some-
one else, although they may actually be reinforcing
oppressive gender roles.30
She goes on to note that would-be fathers can also be
seen as oppressors of their wives, who, believing it is
their duty to mother their husband's genetic child,
"could be caught in the same kind of false consciousness
and relative powerlessness as surrogates who feel called
upon to produce children for others."'
These arguments seem intuitively correct: another
key to surrogate motherhood is the traditional (and op-
pressive) female role it reinforces. The male's right to
have a child is seen as paramount, and any interest the
mother might have in their child is subordinated to
it--even though a male has no more right to have a child
than he does to have a fertile wife or to prevent his wife
from being sterilized or from having an abortion. Men
simply don't have this power over women, and we do
not advance sexual equality by promoting a scheme that
subordinates females so completely to male interests.
The "surrogate mother" is asked not only to per-
form this "service" for the male, but also to engage in
purposeful self-deception. Like Carol, she is asked to
pretend that the child she is carrying is not her own, but
only the father's. The country's most famous surrogate
mother, Elizabeth Kane, told her fairy tale simply during
her pregnancy: "It's not my baby, it's the father's. I'm
just growing it for him."32 Another has declared on
national television: "Motherhood is not biological." 33
Nor is the father's wife unaffected. As one infertile wife
announced in support of surrogacy, "The most reward-
ing thing a woman can do is raise her husband's
child." 3 4 The supposition that the women in surrogacy
are involved in a "liberating" experience is akin to the
supposition that selling one's kidney gives one the free-
dom to control one's body.
But surrogacy involves more than just fairy tale--like
self-deception. It involves real degradation of the preg-
nant woman by proclaiming that the most important
concern is not her welfare but that of the fetus she is
carrying. And this is what makes this "harebrained"
idea both so offensive and so potentially important sym-
bolically for women. The lower court judge in the Baby
M case, for example, termed surrogacy a "viable
vehicle" to help deliver a baby to the Sterns; and the
Sterns' expert witness termed Ms. Whitehead simply a
"surrogate uterus. '" The contract Noel Keane drafted,
and which she signed, gave rights over her activities and
body during the pregnancy to the father (William Stern),
who could not only require that she undergo amniocen-
tesis but also that she abort a handicapped child at his
demand. If she refused, his contract obligations ended
s6
This untenable proposition-that a pregnant wom-
an's life is not her own but, rather, that others should be
able to determine her activities based on what they
think is in the best interests of the fetus she is
carrying-underlies surrogacy. The contract attempts to
get the mother to fantasize that she is simply a container
carrying a precious cargo that she dare not injure. Since,
surrogacy does not take place in a vacuum, other phy-
sicians and courts have adopted the view that pregnancy
is just for the fetus, and have ordered women to submit
to Cesarean sections for the sake of their fetuses. 7 In
one outrageous case (since vacated), a court even or-
dered a dying woman to undergo emergency surgery
against her will, to deliver a fetus that was of question-
able viability. s8 I have argued elsewhere that these cases
were wrongly decided.39 But they are consistent with the
notion that pregnant women are not fully human and
can properly be viewed as containers; and it is of at least
passing interest that even the Baby M court cited the
worst of these cases with apparent approval.4 °
The New Jersey Supreme Court is on solid ground in
holding that surrogate mother contracts can never be
specifically enforceable and that women must have the
right to change their minds and assert their maternal
rights to rear their children, at least up to the time after
birth provided by the state's adoption statute.4' The
New Jersey Supreme Court also seems correct in decree-
ing that when the woman does assert her maternal
rights, she should retain custody during the legal battle
over permanent custody, a decision that ultimately must
be based on the best interests of the child.4 Arguing
that we should try to prevent such custody battles by
contract is tangential: the way to prevent them entirely
is simply not to engage in this type of arrangement.
Objecting to making decisions after birth in the child's
best interests, and ignoring the interests of the child be-
fore birth, simply exposes the fact that the surrogacy
arrangement never considers the child's welfare, only
the welfare of the contracting parents. Nor is the argu-
ment that the child is always better off existing than not
existing sufficient to justify surrogacy from the child's
perspective. 43 Unconceived children have no "right to
exist," and we do not harm them by not conceiving
them or by prohibiting such practices as polygamy. We
do, however, harm real children by commodifying them,
forceably separating them from their natural mothers,
and setting up situations that predictably lead to unsta-
ble and uncertain family relationships.
What Should Be Done?
I understand those who would prohibit not just com-
mercial surrogacy, but voluntary surrogacy as well. But
just as we permit organ donations among living family
members, we may also wish to permit relatives (espe-
cially sisters) to have children for each other. My own
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preference is for legislation aimed at what has been mis-
termed "full surrogacy," the hiring of a woman to carry
a fetus to whom she is not genetically related. This will
involve "high tech" IVF and embryo transfer (and prob-
ably freezing), and could become more popular since the
resulting child will be the genetic child of both the hus-
band and wife (assuming they supply the gametes). Use
of this technology could much more radically alter our
notions of pregnancy and motherhood.
To prevent the gross exploitation of poor women, to
prevent pregnant women from being viewed simply as
vessels, to recognize the greater contribution of gesta-
tion to the child, and to ensure that the child is protected
by having at least one parent with responsibility for it
available at birth, the gestational mother should be ir-
rebuttably considered the rearing mother for all legal
purposes. She could give the child up to the genetic
mother and father after birth, but only by acting in con-
formity with the state's adoption laws. Permitting the
gestational presumption to be modified by contract
would make all pregnancies and all births suspect. No
one would know who the newborn's "mother" was un-
til contracts were examined and genetic testing per-
formed. This "suspended motherhood" model is (or
should be) societally insupportable, since it endangers
all mothers and children. A statute that irrebuttably pre-
sumes the gestational mother to be the child's legal
mother for all purposes would protect both mothers and
children, and should be enacted in all states."
The second statute I endorse is one that would out-
law the sale of human embryos. A few states have al-
ready enacted legislation to do this. Embryo freezing is
just beginning in the U.S., but it will not be long before
it is commonplace. The attempted commercialization
and sale of frozen embryos will not be far behind. Like
children, embryos will be bought and sold in the belief
that they will produce a healthy child, and probably one
of a certain physical type, IQ, stature, and so on. All of
these characteristics will command a specific market
price-thereby monetizing the characteristics of all live
children.45 Because of this, and the fact that selling hu-
man embryos brings with it almost all of the problems
and evils of selling children, their sale should be prohib-
ited by statute.46
Commercial "surrogate motherhood" deserves the
death without dignity that Rumpelstiltskin suffered.
Legislation to try to resuscitate it and put it ontempo-
rary life-support systems would not be in the best inter-
ests of children, families, or society. But it has given us
the opportunity to anticipate and plan for the next gen-
eration of issues brought to us by real science. We
should act now to support economic and sexual equal-
ity, and to protect future children and families from
commercial exploitation. We should work for a future
in which pregnant women retain their personhood, a
future of economic and social justice, rather than a fu-
ture based on economic violence and social inequality.
The fairy tales surrogate mothers tell must not be taken
seriously.
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